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Abstract: 
International organizations have increasingly become engaged in developing transnational 
memory frames for the Holocaust. Based on document analysis and interviews with 
transnational norm entrepreneurs, this article explores the role and interaction of three 
organizations: the European Union, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and 
UNESCO. It employs the multi-level governance approach to analyze how Prime Minister 
Göran Persson and a ‘progressive’ alliance of Western politicians initially ‘uploaded’ a 
Swedish initiative to the EU and the UN system. In the EU, however, East-Central European 
norm entrepreneurs have increasingly pushed for greater emphasis on Stalinist crimes, which 
has reinforced the totalitarian paradigm and effectively undermined Holocaust remembrance. 
In contrast, the battle over the possible link between Holocaust remembrance, collective 
identity and political legitimacy is absent from the UN system. The UN and UNESCO have 
transformed the Holocaust into a universal code for the need to protect human rights and 
democracy. 
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International Organizations and Holocaust Remembrance: From Europe to the World 
 
Attempts to export norms for remembrance and related practices across borders usually 
stimulate complex negotiation processes. Such norms and practices are adapted to local 
circumstances and mnemonic cultures – or their transfer is rejected outright. In the case of 
Holocaust remembrance in Europe, for example, Timothy Garton Ash (2002) and others (e.g. 
Novick 2007) have opposed the Europeanization of what they have called the ‘German 
[national technical ] DIN norm’ for the desirable collective memory of the extermination of 
European Jewry during the Second World War. 
This article traces how international and supranational organizations have constituted 
important forums for developing transnational memory frames for the Holocaust. Together 
they have developed into what, in an analogy with political science characterizations of the 
European Union (EU) (Hooghe & Marks 2001), could be called a loosely connected multi-
level governance system for promoting international norms for Holocaust remembrance and 
education. We explore how in this system, norm entrepreneurs act transnationally in seeking 
to promote the Europeanization and internationalization of norms for Holocaust remembrance 
working with networks of survivors and memorial sites, partly transnationally constituted 
political parties, and national governments. 
Based on document analysis and interviews with transnational norm entrepreneurs, the article 
explores the role and interaction of three organizations at the regional European and 
international levels: the EU with exclusively European membership on one side and, on the 
other, the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, 
and Research (ITF, since 2013 the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)) 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with 
global membership. We argue that the fit of Holocaust remembrance with their respective 
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institutional competences and political agendas at particular points in time largely accounts 
for these organizations’ institutional activism in this field. We also provide initial evidence for 
institutionalized and network-type informal connections across the different governance levels 
of Holocaust remembrance. In the next step, we will explore these connections more 
systematically to map the emerging multi-level governance system more fully. 
In the first section, the article traces the attempted internationalization of Holocaust 
remembrance which culminated in the Declaration of the International Forum on the 
Holocaust and the introduction of 27 January (the date of the liberation of the death camp 
Auschwitz) as the International Holocaust Remembrance Day at a conference in Stockholm in 
late January 2000. This conference and its declaration have also been interpreted as evidence 
of the Holocaust as a (potential) ‘European foundation myth’ (Leggewie 2011). Several 
leading politicians and national governments employed the Stockholm agenda soon 
afterwards to justify bilateral ‘measures’ of 14 EU member states against the newly formed 
Austrian government (Hummer & Pelinka 2002). 
The article also highlights the limits of the transnationalization of Holocaust remembrance, 
however. Negotiation processes about remembrance within the EU have produced lowest 
common denominator compromises. Exploring the examples of parliamentary resolutions and 
recent cultural projects like the ‘New Narrative for Europe’ and the House of European 
History museum, the second section shows how Holocaust remembrance has become 
marginalized once more in the EU. This marginalization has mainly been effected by norm 
entrepreneurs from the new East-Central European member states successfully promoting the 
totalitarian paradigm with the aim of inserting their memory of Stalinist crimes into EU 
narratives. 
The third section analyzes how the ITF/IHRA and UNESCO have come to construct 
Holocaust memory in an attempt to transcend regional, political, and religious-cultural 
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borders by treating it as an example of, and code for crimes against humanity – a generalized 
notion that connects well with international legal and normative traditions that have shaped 
the UN system (Singh 2016; Weiss 2015). For UNESCO, Holocaust remembrance and 
education have become strategies in a broader fight against racism and violence. Crucially, 
the process of up-loading Holocaust remembrance norms with strong support from EU-based 
actors created institutional path dependencies in the UN system before new East-Central 
European member states and actors began to influence the rewriting of EU narratives 
sometime after 2004. 
  
The last section, finally, draws conclusions about the role of international and supranational 
organizations in transnational negotiation processes about remembrance. It raises the 
analytical and normative question whether processes of Europeanization and 
internationalization could entail that the Holocaust becomes a mere symbol of extreme 
violence, losing its particularities and dissolving into less distinctive descriptions. 
 
Internationalizing Holocaust Remembrance 
 
The establishment of the ITF/IHRA in 1998, the origins of the Declaration of the International 
Forum on the Holocaust and the introduction of the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Day in 2000 exemplify the role of norm entrepreneurs in attempts in international settings and 
organizations to internationalize Holocaust remembrance. In June 1997, the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter shocked its readers with the headline ‘Racists reach the youth’ 
(Sjöblom 1997). The article pointed out that only two-thirds of Swedish youth – independent 
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of their ethnic and religious background – believed that the Holocaust had actually happened. 
(Lööw 1998, 2004, 2010; Nilsson 1998; Deland & Westin 2007).   
As a result, the social democratic Prime Minister Göran Persson, a former minister of 
education, initiated a debate in the Swedish parliament on the need for Holocaust education, 
which resulted in an information campaign entitled ‘Levande historie’ or ‘Living history’ 
(Allwork 2015). This campaign culminated in 1998 with the publication of the history book 
…Om detta må ni berätta (Tell Ye Your Children) (Bruchfeldt & Levine 1998). The book  
embeds the presentation of the Holocaust as a historical phenomenon in a broader discussion 
about the equality of all human beings and the values and benefits of democracy underlining 
the link between the neglect of human rights and democracy and the threat of war and 
genocide. Some 1.3 million copies of the book have been distributed free of charge, and it is 
now also available via the homepage of the LHF (The Living History Forum undated; 
Karlsson and Zander 2004). 
For Persson though, the 1997-8 national campaign was not enough. In his view, international 
measures and an international organization were needed to promote Holocaust education. For 
this purpose he drew on a network of ‘progressive’ politicians preoccupied with defining a 
new normatively constituted world order after the end of the Cold War (Ladrech 2000). In 
Europe, their search was closely connected with the notion of the EU as a ‘normative power’ 
which was much debated around the turn of the century (Diez 2005; Manners 2002). Persson 
contacted US President Bill Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and suggested that 
their countries should join forces and strive to establish international cooperation on 
Holocaust education (Persson 2006). The first meeting of the newly constituted ITF/IHRA 
took place in Stockholm on 7 May 1998. The ITF/IHRA’s scope was then expanded to 
include Holocaust remembrance and research. Representatives of forty-six governments 
subsequently attended the conference Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 
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January 2000 which marked the breakthrough for the organization as an international norm 
entrepreneur (Allwork 2015; Plessow 2015; Karlsson & Zander 2004; ITF/IHRA 2000). 
The Stockholm Declaration states that ‘The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the 
foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold 
universal meaning.’ It goes on to commit the signatories to encouraging ‘the study of the 
Holocaust in all its dimensions’, to promoting ‘education about the Holocaust in our schools 
(…) and in our communities’, and to commemorating ‘the victims of the Holocaust and to 
honour those who stood against it’. The signatories also demanded (but did not define more 
clearly) ‘appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance’ and introduced the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Day. 
Three further conferences were held between 2001 and 2004 (Fried 2006). These conferences 
had a broader scope than the Holocaust and focused on combating intolerance (2001), justice 
and reconciliation (2002), and preventing genocides (2004). Both Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-
General, and Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and its 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, were keynote speakers at 
the conference held in 2004. Annan announced that he was determined to strengthen the UN’s 
capacity for action against genocide (Fried 2006, 7). The UN was to shift its focus from 
reaction to the prevention of genocide. Annan underlined that Holocaust remembrance and 
education were essential strategies to achieve this aim.  
At the start of 2018, the ITF/IHRA as a formally intergovernmental organization comprised 
31 member states, eleven observer states, and seven so-called permanent international 
partners (IHRA undated[a]). It operates as a broad transnational network of norm 
entrepreneurs. Since its creation it has launched several initiatives that aim at 
internationalizing standards of Holocaust education, remembrance and research through 
documents e.g. for teachers which are disseminated online (IHRA undated[b]). The 
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ITF/IHRA has also compiled memorial databases to show connections between remembrance 
cultures and the development of memorial sites. It has initiated joint research projects and 
recommended literature on the Holocaust, thus giving certain books and articles international 
legitimacy. 
The internationalisation of Persson’s initiative went hand in hand with its institutionalization 
in Sweden. In his speech to the Swedish Parliament on 27 January 2000 he announced the 
date as an official Swedish remembrance day of the Holocaust and the institutionalization of 
the Living History project as a permanent centre for remembrance, research and discussion. 
(Persson 2000). In December 2001 the Swedish Parliament formally established The Living 
History Forum (LHF) as a public body for Holocaust education associated with the Ministry 
of Culture (Living History Forum undated). In 2009, the LHF published a revised edition of 
the history book which also includes a chapter on Sweden and the Holocaust (Bruchfeld & 
Levine 2009). This chapter discusses Sweden – neutral and unoccupied during the Second 
World War – as a bystander, thus contributing to the more recent evolution of international 
perspectives on the role of perpetrators and bystanders in the Holocaust.  The LHF is also 
responsible for co-ordinating Sweden’s participation in ITF/IHRA (Karlsson & Zander 2004). 
Swedish actors played a crucial role in initiating the ITF/IHRA. Others supported the 
initiative from the beginning, like Blair and Clinton, and lend the newly established task force 
political legitimacy (Allwork 2015, 46-52).  Appointing Yehuda Bauer as head of the 
academic committee moreover gave it scholarly legitimacy and access to an important 
international network. Apart from Argentina, Canada, Israel and the United States, however, 
as of 2018 all ITF/IHRA members are European countries, and all but three of those (Norway, 
Serbia, Switzerland) are EU member states. Thus, the EU and its member states heavily 
dominate the organization. 
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In fact, within the EU the declamatory internationalization of Holocaust remembrance at the 
2000 Stockholm Conference quickly became linked to bilateral ‘measures’ (popularly known 
as ‘sanctions’) by the 14 other EU member states against the new Austrian government. At 
the time of the Stockholm Conference, the centre-right Austrian People’s Party was 
negotiating the formation of a coalition government with the right-wing populist Freedom 
Party under the leadership of Jörg Haider. With its pan-Germanic origins, its post-war role as 
a refuge for Austrian Nazis, and Haider’s nationalistic rhetoric directed against immigrants 
and the supranational EU (Wodak & Pelinka 2009), the Freedom Party was an obvious target 
for the fight against racism, antisemitism and nationalism which EU member state 
governments, alongside others, had just proclaimed at Stockholm. The bilateral ‘measures’ 
proved to be illegal under EU law (Schmahl 2000; Schorkopf 2000), however, and highly 
divisive in several EU member states. After a report by three ‘Wise men’ appointed to review 
them, they were duly lifted in September 2000. 
The ‘measures’ strongly politicized the larger Stockholm Conference agenda in the EU even 
before the 2004 Eastern enlargement. During and directly after the conference they were 
informally prepared by the outgoing social democratic Austrian Chancellor Viktor Klima, 
António Guterres, President of the Socialist International and Prime Minister of Portugal, 
which held the rotating European Council presidency at the time, and the German social 
democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer from the 
Green Party (Kaiser 2003, 507-9). Fischer in particular propagated the ‘measures’ in the 
German Bundestag parliament and in a major speech on European union in May 2000 as a 
symbol of the character of the EU as a ‘community of values’, not an ‘economic club’ 
(Fischer 2000a; Fischer 2000b). 
Thus, the impetus from the Stockholm Conference and the ‘measures’ combined created an 
astonishing dynamism for the normative Europeanization of Holocaust remembrance in the 
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EU. Since then, Holocaust remembrance has become not a hard legal, but a soft cultural 
condition for accession to the EU (Littoz-Monnet 2013). At the same time, the EU only has 
subsidiary competences in the fields of culture and education (Holthoff 2008). From the 
beginning therefore, it has had only very limited options for actually supporting activities 
related to Holocaust remembrance. It has mainly done so in the ‘European Remembrance’ so-
called ‘Action’ of the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme geared towards enhancing civic 
participation at EU level and strengthening transnational contacts, cooperation and networks 
(Littoz-Monnet 2012). During the 2007-13 funding period, however, the programme already 
included a number of projects aimed at fostering remembrance of Stalinist crimes during 
communist rule in Eastern Europe after 1945. Moreover, as the next section will show, the 
importance of the Holocaust for promoting a more aligned European memory in the EU has 
declined once more in recent years as a result of the very active propagation of remembering 
Stalinist crimes by East-Central European norm entrepreneurs in the wake of the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement. 
 
Totalitarian Paradigm versus Singularity of the Holocaust 
 
The totalitarian paradigm has its origins in the works of Hannah Arendt (1951). As an 
explanatory framework for understanding the history of twentieth century Europe, it strongly 
emphasizes the structural similarities in the regimes of oppression between National Socialist, 
fascist and authoritarian military dictatorships on one side and Stalinist and communist 
systems on the other. Its focus on structures of oppression tends to marginalize differences in 
ideologies, motivations and societal support. The totalitarian paradigm has influenced 
academic debate about European history and it has left traces in its popular imagination. Since 
the end of the Cold War, however, and especially since the EU’s 2004 enlargement, East-
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Central European norm entrepreneurs have pushed the totalitarian paradigm more consistently 
once more as a suitable shared frame for understanding twentieth century European history 
(Mälksoo 2014, 2009). At home it is frequently employed to buttress patriotic master 
narratives that emphasize victimization under the communist systems and minimize 
collaboration with Nazi Germany and participation in the Holocaust. These norm 
entrepreneurs have chiefly utilized two primary European avenues for propagating greater 
attention to Stalinist crimes in post-war East-Central Europe: debates and resolutions in the 
European Parliament (EP), and major EP-initiated cultural projects. 
Passing resolutions is an established instrument used by parliaments to instigate legislation or, 
in this case, to influence public debates. In the EU using this parliamentary tool for memory 
politics is a more recent phenomenon (Kaiser 2012). The EP’s 2005 resolution on ‘the 
remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-semitism and racism’ still drew explicitly on the 
Stockholm Declaration. It underlines that ‘the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Nazi 
Germany’s death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau (…) is not only a major occasion for European 
citizens to remember and condemn the enormous horror and tragedy of the Holocaust, but 
also for addressing the disturbing rise in anti-semitism, and especially anti-semitic incidents, 
in Europe …’ (EP 2005). The resolution goes on to demand that the Holocaust must be 
remembered ‘as a warning against genocide of this kind, rooted in contempt for other human 
beings, hatred, anti-semitism, racism and totalitarianism’. The resolution introduced 27 
January as the ‘European Holocaust Memorial Day’ and encouraged EU member states to 
promote Holocaust education in schools and at memorial-sites, as a strategy to combat 
contemporary anti-semitism and racism. 
Passed with 553 votes against 44 (European Parliament 2009), the EP’s resolution on 
‘European conscience and totalitarianism’ of 2 April 2009 already differs markedly from the 
2005 resolution, however. While the Stockholm Declaration highlighted the ‘unprecedented 
11 
 
character’ of the Holocaust as the base point of new norms of international remembrance, the 
EP resolution inserts the Holocaust into a larger consensus-oriented narrative of the crimes of 
totalitarian regimes, effectively downplaying its importance. The EP resolution also led to the 
institutionalization of 23 August (the day of the signature of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939) as 
a Europe-wide so-called Remembrance Day ‘for victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian 
regimes’ – a form of institutionalization that mirrors the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Day, but also competes with it in Europe’s evolving remembrance culture. 
The 2009 resolution refers to the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, but not to the Stockholm Declaration. It mentions ‘the 
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights’ – values violated by forms of ‘totalitarian rule’ in the twentieth century. The 
resolution also stresses that ‘From the perspective of the victims it is immaterial which regime 
deprived them of their liberty or tortured or murdered them for whatever reason’. In fact, it 
only mentions the Holocaust towards the end. After stating under point ‘G’ that ‘millions of 
victims were deported, imprisoned, tortured and murdered by totalitarian and authoritarian 
regimes (…) in Europe’, the resolution adds, coming out of the blue at this point, that ‘the 
uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless [!] be acknowledged’ – a phrase that marks a 
concession to sections of the political Left in the EP who were concerned about protecting the 
singularity thesis and the place of the Holocaust in European remembrance policies and 
practices more generally (Neumeyer 2015). As Nazi Germany orchestrated the industrial 
extermination of European Jews, however, the resolution’s strong emphasis on the 
comparability of the totalitarian regimes and the similarity of their crimes actually undermines 
the singularity thesis. 
Similarly, the earlier emphasis on the Holocaust in German debates, the Swedish initiative, 
ITF/IHRA policy and the EU’s bilateral ‘measures’ against the Austrian government has also 
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evaporated in the case of two recent EP-initiated major cultural projects, the ‘New Narrative 
for Europe’ and the House of European History museum. Originating in EP concerns about 
the declining EU legitimacy and its apparent lack of a proper cultural foundation, the ‘New 
Narrative’ project was funded during 2012-14 (Kaiser 2015). The project’s objective was to 
‘contribute to raising the interest in the creative sector and to incite European opinion formers 
to make their voice heard’, thus ‘associating the creative sector and the citizens to revamp the 
narrative of Europe’ (Andreu-Romeo 2013). Some 20 people from the cultural sphere formed 
a so-called Cultural Committee. It met bi-monthly and organized three ‘general assemblies’ 
with larger audiences. The committee eventually submitted the declaration ‘New Narrative for 
Europe: The Mind and Body of Europe’ (European Commission 2014b) to Commission 
President José Manuel Barroso and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on 1 March 
2014. 
The European Commission initially believed that it would actually be possible to develop one 
‘all-encompassing’ narrative to legitimize the EU (European Commission 2014a). Under the 
impression of sharp internal and external criticism of this hegemonic language, the 
Commission quickly changed its informal terminology to ‘narratives’ and, in the final version 
of the declaration, to ‘new narrative’ – still in the singular, but less obviously so without the 
indefinite article. But what kind of narrative is it? In fact, the committee’s declaration 
emphasizes generic contemporary norms and values that are hardly embedded in any 
legitimizing historical narrative. Despite its length of four pages, it only refers to historical 
events before 1989 in one paragraph of three sentences, lumping together both world wars. 
The text makes no explicit reference to the Holocaust or perpetrators. Instead, it uses quasi-
religious language to claim that Europe ‘damned itself within the concentration camps and the 
totalitarian systems associated with extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, the abolition of 
democracy and rule of law, the sacrifice of individual freedom and the suppression of civil 
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society’. Through (Western) European integration after 1945, however, Europe’s ‘soul was 
restored’. Europeans redeemed themselves with the pacifist forward-looking integration 
‘project’. 
This narrative dissolution of the Holocaust in a broader discourse about totalitarian regimes 
and crimes in twentieth century Europe is also replicated in the House of European History 
(HEH) museum that opened in Brussels in May 2017 – although the museum’s explicit focus 
is on Europe’s history. The micro-network behind this plan was keen to use the future 
museum for strengthening the EU’s cultural integration and political legitimacy (Kaiser et al. 
2014, ch. 3; Pöttering 2010). EP President Hans-Gert Pöttering was quite explicit about this 
overriding objective. At the inaugural meeting on 3 March 2008 of the Committee of Experts 
charged with preparing a general plan for the museum, he stated that the ‘political discourse 
of the day [lacks] an historical view, which might help to foster such a sense [of identity]’. 
His hope was that the HEH could ‘give a fresh boost to a spiritual dimension for the EU, 
focusing heavily on the European integration process.’ He added that the HEH should place 
particular emphasis ‘on the values underpinning integration’ (Committee of Experts 2008). 
In the meantime, however, with the support of the historians in the revamped Academic 
Committee, the team of curators appointed during 2010-11 has rewritten the original plan 
considerably for the first permanent exhibition. They have downplayed the Western European 
(integration) experience and strengthened East-Central European perspectives on twentieth 
century European history (Kaiser 2017). To some extent, this shift has resulted from 
personnel policy. During the EP presidency of Jerzy Buzek, a Polish member of the centre-
right European People’s Party, the Slovene Taja Vovk van Gaal became leader of the team of 
curators. She had practically no knowledge of, or interest in the experience of Western 
European integration after 1945, which was after all supposed to be the museum’s core focus. 
When she presented her initial ideas to the team of curators she heavily emphasized the 
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Stalinist experience in Eastern Europe and the everyday lives of Europeans (Itzel 2012). At 
the same time, Włodzimierz Borodziej, professor of Modern History at the University of 
Warsaw and politically close to Buzek’s party, took charge of the revamped Academic 
Committee. East-Central European perspectives on European history became further 
strengthened through the inclusion of inter alia the nationalist conservative Hungarian curator 
Mária Schmidt, director of the House of Terror museum in Budapest. 
Vovk van Gaal’s preference  and that of others on her team and the Academic Committee for 
discussing Stalinism and the fate of Europeans behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ on a par with 
National Socialism and the Western European experience is largely reflected in the HEH 
narrative. The permanent exhibition symmetrically compares the Nazi and Stalinist regimes 
and their crimes on level 4, which responds to a key demand in East-Central European 
memory politics and conforms to the EP’s more recent remembrance policies as in its 2009 
resolution. The permanent exhibition also treats the Holocaust far less prominently than might 
have been expected in a more traditional Western European setting. Thus, the Academic 
Committee recommended at an early stage in its deliberations that an ‘exhibition with the 
Shoa and the World Wars at its centre’ was ‘not being made for the future’ (Academic 
Committee 2011). They also opposed the idea of a separate room or space devoted 
specifically to the annihilation of European Jews. Instead, the HEH weaves the Holocaust 
experience loosely into the three sections about the Nazi regime, the Second World War and 
its memory (Academic Committee 2014). 
In the end, just as the EP resolutions on European history have sought to integrate Western 
and Eastern European experiences and preferences, the HEH narrative also represents a 
compromise. Despite adopting the totalitarian paradigm and marginalizing the Holocaust in 
its narrative, it does not cross two red lines of the Stockholm Declaration and associated 
memory discourses, which – in the words of the nationalist conservative Hungarian museum 
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director Schmidt (Schmidt 2012) – marked the ‘framework of censorship’ in the Academic 
Committee. While comparing the National Socialist and Stalinist regimes, the exhibition 
argues that they were nonetheless ‘not equal’ and ‘very different in their ideological roots and 
goals’ (Academic Committee 2014). Using a key phrase from the Stockholm Declaration, 
moreover, the exhibition points out that ‘the industrialized genocide on European Jews 
organized by the Nazis with bureaucratic precision was without precedence in world history’ 
(Academic Committee 2014). The permanent exhibition still defends the singularity thesis, 
although only in respect of the industrial scale of the mass murder. 
Thus, in the past ten years Europe has become a ‘battlefield’ (Leggewie 2011) for memory 
politics and different and partly competing remembrance priorities. In East-Central Europe as 
elsewhere, actual memory of the past including the Holocaust is fragmented and divided 
(Assmann 2013; Uhl 2009). Actors on the political centre-right and nationalist Right in East-
Central Europe – especially in Poland – have invested much time and resources lately, 
however, to influence what they regard as Western European dominated narratives of the past, 
to incorporate their own stories of collective victimization under communist rule during the 
Cold War more fully. Their demands for greater attention being paid to Stalinist crimes have 
effectively undermined Holocaust remembrance, at least in the form originally envisaged by 
the dominant ‘progressive’ political alliance at the time of the 2000 Stockholm Declaration. 
More recent political developments like the refugee crisis may well induce a further 
weakening of the narrative focus on the Holocaust and could strengthen nationalist narratives 
in countries like Poland and Hungary, for example, . In contrast, focussing on education rather 
than politically charged discourse and prestigious cultural projects as in the EU seems to have 
facilitated the internationalization of Holocaust remembrance in the context of the UN system 
and its specialized agency UNESCO. 
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Holocaust Education as a Global Norm for Securing Peace? 
 
The preamble to UNESCO’s constitution states that ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it 
is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’ (UNESCO 1945). 
Since its formation as a specialized UN agency in 1945-6, UNESCO has sought to ‘ensure 
peace and security’ through numerous educational, scientific, cultural and informational 
projects. UNESCO’s Education for International Understanding Initiative (1974) aimed to 
establish global standards for history textbooks based on the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Reich & Pivovarov 1994). The UNESCO projects reflect a 
strong belief in the transformative power of education, where people should learn to welcome 
difference and diversity on the basis of respect and tolerance. Nevertheless, the Holocaust did 
not become a major focus for either the UN or UNESCO until after 2000, when Persson and 
the ITF/IHRA began lobbying the UN system to engage in Holocaust remembrance.  
Today UNESCO offers online resources for Holocaust education (as part of the human rights 
educational initiative) because ‘teaching about the history of the Holocaust is fundamental to 
establishing respect for human rights, basic freedoms and the values of tolerance and mutual 
respect’ (UNESCO undated). Thus, Holocaust remembrance and education has become 
embedded in UNESCO’s concept of education as peace-keeping. UN member states are 
encouraged ‘to develop educational programmes that transmit the memory of the Holocaust to 
future generations so as to prevent genocide from occurring again’ (UNESCO undated). 
UNESCO’s mission is part of wider UN action on Holocaust remembrance. In his speech at 
the fourth ITF/IHRA conference in Stockholm in 2004, Annan announced increased UN 
preventive actions against genocide and stressed the learning effect of Holocaust education 
(Fried 2006, 7). In an attempt to globalize the aims and values of the 2000 Stockholm 
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Declaration the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/7 on Holocaust remembrance 
by consensus, without taking a vote, on 1 November 2005 (UN General Assembly 2005a). 
Iran though publicly disassociated itself from this consensus. In the same year the Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad repeatedly denied that the Holocaust had happened. He 
also called for Israel to be wiped off the map (see Litvak & Webman 2011). 
Following the ITF/IHRA example, the UN designated 27 January as ‘an annual International 
Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust’. Moreover, the General 
Assembly urged the member states to develop related educational programmes. The 
resolution explicitly commended the work of the ITF/IHRA as exemplary for how such 
programmes should be developed, thus providing it and the Stockholm Declaration with 
additional legitimacy. The UN resolution resulted in the establishment of The Holocaust and 
the United Nations Outreach Programme with its motto ‘Remembrance and Beyond’ (UN 
General Assembly 2005b). This programme seeks to disseminate knowledge about the 
Holocaust to ‘mobilize civil society for Holocaust remembrance and education, in order to 
help prevent future acts of genocide’ (Ibid.). The Outreach Programme cooperates closely 
with the ITF/IHRA in promoting Holocaust remembrance and education. The UN’s 
Department of Public Information’s Holocaust Programme is a permanent observer at the 
plenary meetings of the ITF/IHRA. It also participates in its Educational Working Group, as 
well as in the two sub-committees on Holocaust and Other Genocides and Holocaust 
Remembrance Days. The close institutionalized cooperation between the UN and the 
ITF/IHRA indicates how actors and networks engage in the multi-level ‘up-loading’ and 
‘down-loading’ of what the Stockholm Declaration called ‘appropriate forms’ of Holocaust 
remembrance and education.  
Six months after resolution 60/7 the UN entered the debate on Holocaust denial, clearly 
motivated by the Iranian anti-Holocaust and anti-Israel hate campaign. On 26 January 2007  
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the General Assembly consensually adopted Resolution 61/255 condemning Holocaust denial 
(UN General Assembly 2007)  not least as a factor that can increase the risk of future 
genocides. Thus, the two UN resolutions adopted the main principles of the Stockholm 
Declaration for the global level and institutionalized them in one of the UN’s Outreach 
Programmes. Crucially, the up-loading of the Stockholm Declaration’s principles took effect 
before the new East-Central European states and actors successfully modified the singularity 
thesis through the new emphasis on the totalitarian experience in EP resolutions and projects. 
So far, moreover, the same East-Central European actors have not felt the need to lobby for 
the recognition of the importance of Stalinist crimes outside of the immediately relevant and 
highly politicized EU context. 
UNESCO has closely related to developments in the wider UN system. In 2007 it adopted a 
resolution on Holocaust remembrance (UNESCO 2007). This resolution requested the 
UNESCO Director General to consult with the UN Secretary-General about the UN Outreach 
Programme in order to explore what role UNESCO could play in promoting Holocaust 
remembrance. As the UN’s specialized agency for education UNESCO highlights the 
transformative power of education in the wider German sense of Bildung. Education is seen as 
a fundamental part of active citizenship and sustainable development. Education should not 
only transmit cognitive knowledge about the past, but also promote skills, values and 
attitudes. The Holocaust due to its normative power is presented as a key event for teaching 
about and preventing future genocides and mass atrocities and forraising awareness of the 
need for democracy and human rights. Following the 2007 resolution, UNESCO createdits 
own programme entitled ‘Education for Holocaust Remembrance’. According to the UN, the 
two programmes complement each other: ‘while the Holocaust and the United Nations 
Outreach Programme aims to mobilize civil society for Holocaust and education in order to 
prevent future acts of genocide, UNESCO seeks to promote Holocaust remembrance through 
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education’ (UN undated). In reality, however, the profile of the two programmes is very 
similar. Both see Holocaust remembrance and education as strategies to prevent genocides 
and promote democracy and human rights. UNESCO has incorporated its Holocaust 
education into intercultural education and human rights training to facilitate learning from the 
past. Its key idea is that increased knowledge about the Holocaust will prevent future 
genocides. According to this view, the Holocaust is a ‘universal issue’ and contains the 
‘characteristics that appear in other genocides (…) e.g. a specific victim group or groups, 
mass violence against that group, and deprivation of the essentials for human existence’ 
(UNESCO 2013, 7). According to UNESCO, two dimensions explain the singularity of the 
Holocaust: first, the intended extermination of all Jews; and second, the absence of ‘a 
pragmatic purpose’ in the form of an economic, political or military motive, as the Holocaust 
was exclusively motivated by racism (UNESCO 2013, 7). 
Despite the emphasis on the singularity of the Holocaust, UNESCO transforms Holocaust 
remembrance into a tool for peace and intercultural understanding. According to UNESCO’s 
guidelines, Holocaust education goes beyond disseminating ‘factual’ historical knowledge of 
the Holocaust. The instructions underline the importance of discussing the responsibility of 
individuals and public institutions, the danger of not speaking up against injustice, the roots of 
prejudice and racism, and the dangers of modern technology – that is, ‘lessons of the past 
(Holocaust)’ which offer a moral framework for the future and may help prevent genocide 
and injustice from happening again (UNESCO 2013, 7). 
‘Education for Holocaust Remembrance’ has resulted in two studies that reflect UNESCO’s 
long-term attempt to develop standards for history and education on a global level. First, 
international assessments on education by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the EU-funded Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA), the Institute of Education of the University of London, the ITF/IHRA and the 
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UNESCO carried out between 2005 and 2009, revealed that teaching about the Holocaust in 
terms of structure, quantity, and content differs greatly across and within countries (UNESCO 
2015). For that reason in 2012, UNESCO launched a research project on the Holocaust in 
curricula worldwide in cooperation with the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook 
Research in Brunswick, Germany (UNESCO 2015, 3). The project report identifies 
‘domestication’ as a key global trend (UNESCO 2015, 13, 76f.): national educational 
institutions tend to emphasize the local significance of the Holocaust and appropriate it for a 
local, regional or national historical framework to make it easier for citizens to relate to it – 
findings that plainly contradict Natan Sznaider and Daniel Levy’s notion of the evolution of 
‘global memory’ or a ‘cosmopolitan culture of memory’ (Sznaider & Levy 2005). 
In the same year that it launched this study, UNESCO also sought to contribute to the 
development of global standards by organizing an international expert meeting on ‘Holocaust 
Education in a Global Context’. It took place in Paris in 2012 and was organized in 
partnership with the German foundation Topography of Terror. A wide range of Holocaust 
and genocide educators and historians from several countries participated. According to Irina 
Bokova, the Director-General of UNESCO, teaching and learning about the Holocaust was 
necessary ‘to raise awareness about a shared history, to promote human rights everywhere and 
eliminate all forms of discrimination and violence’. The conference results were compiled in a 
free online publication (Fracapane & Hass 2014). While the book discusses various 
approaches to teaching the Holocaust, it still suggests from a normative perspective what may 
be better or worse ways of doing so. The publication also incorporates recommendations by 
the ITF/IHRA on how genocide education can be taught in comparative perspective 
(Fracapane & Hass 2014, 101f.). Karel Fracapane, one of the editors, had in fact worked for 
the ITF/IHRA from 2003 to 2007 – an example of the close links between the two 
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organizations, in addition to UNESCO’s official status as permanent international partner of 
the ITF/IHRA. 
The strong connection between the LHF, ITF/IHRA and UNESCO highlights how promoting 
international norms for Holocaust remembrance and education has taken place in a 
governance system that at least loosely connects norm entrepreneurs across multiple levels 
from the national to the European and global. The institutionalization of the LHF as the 
‘Swedish answer’ to the Stockholm Declaration created strong potential for shaping the 
ITF/IHRA in the first years of its existence. As the ITF/IHRA grew larger and developed a 
more explicit organizational structure with the establishment of a permanent office in Berlin 
in 2008, the influence of the LHF diminished (Fried 2016). Eva Fried, who has been with the 
LHF since its inception, has acted as a key individual norm entrepreneur linking the two 
organizations. She has been simultaneously the LHF’s coordinator for international affairs 
and Sweden’s main representative in the ITF/IHRA.   
‘Up-loading’ the LHF and ITF/IHRA agenda to UNESCO turned out to fit well with this 
organization’s traditional task of developing international standards for teaching history to 
‘ensure peace and security’. UNESCO could easily incorporate the principles of the 
Stockholm Declaration into its well-established programme of training in human rights and 
intercultural understanding. Moreover, cooperation with the ITF/IHRA has been facilitated as 
this organization has expanded its own focus during the last ten years to include genocide 
remembrance and education more generally. 
 
Conclusion 
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International and supranational organizations have played a greater role as norm entrepreneurs 
in fostering Holocaust remembrance and education since the 2000 Stockholm Declaration. 
This article has identified a number of individual and collective actors who have triggered and 
reinforced associated processes of Europeanization and internationalization of Holocaust 
remembrance policies and practices. Thus, the origins of the ITF/IHRA go back to the 
personal concerns of Prime Minister Göran Persson about the lack of knowledge about the 
Holocaust and the growth of neo-Nazi groups in Sweden. The institutionalization of the 
ITF/IHRA was then driven by a transnational political alliance of ‘progressive’ political 
leaders. The Swedish government subsequently played a key role in up-loading the European-
dominated ITF/IHRA patterns of Holocaust remembrance and education to the global UN and 
UNESCO level. 
In the case of the EU, however, the strong initial support for the Stockholm Declaration and 
its underlying claim about the singularity of the Holocaust has been undermined by the 
progressive integration of the totalitarian paradigm promoted by actors from the new East-
Central European member states after 2004, into the narratives about the European past. As a 
result, EP resolutions and several larger cultural projects have effectively downplayed the 
importance of the Holocaust for some form of more aligned European memory. Crucially, 
emphasis in the EU is on Holocaust remembrance as part of broader attempts to create a more 
meaningful regional European identity which could foster the EU’s cultural legitimacy in 
times of crisis. The resulting negotiating processes have become highly politicized and 
necessitate more consensual narratives that integrate, in particular, diverging Western and 
Eastern European experiences. 
This politicized battle over the possible link between Holocaust remembrance, collective 
identity and political legitimacy is completely absent in the case of the UN system and the 
UNESCO, however, which also focus as much on education as on remembrance. The notion 
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of lessons to be learned from the Holocaust fits well with the UN system’s institutional 
identity as a promoter of human rights, intercultural understanding and non-violent conflict 
resolutions – a broader mission that can to some extent override virulent political conflict 
such as between Iran and Israel. Unlike Europe, where the Holocaust actually took place, and 
the present-day EU, moreover, the UN and UNESCO focus heavily on going beyond 
Holocaust remembrance and education. They transform the historical event into a universal 
argument for the need to protect human rights and democracy, which helps to de-politicize the 
issue. To what extent the UN and UNESCO resolutions and programmes actually have 
significant impact on the ground, especially in countries that are not democratic or see Israel 
as an enemy, or both, is of course a different matter and beyond the scope of this article.  
This article has provided initial evidence of the role of individual and collective actors and 
their networks who have attempted to shape, and are currently shaping, how the Holocaust is 
commemorated and taught. This evidence includes the institutionalized cooperation between 
UNESCO and the ITF/IHRA and the activism of individual norm entrepreneurs like Persson, 
Fracapane and Fried. More research is needed into how international and supranational 
organizations like the EU, the ITF/IHRA, the UN and UNESCO interact with each other and 
with memorial sites like Yad Vashem, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and the House of 
the Wannsee Conference, for example. Such research will allow mapping these networks and 
the relational ties among norm entrepreneurs in their attempts to promote global norms for 
Holocaust education and remembrance. It has already become clear, however, that the multi-
level governance approach can usefully be employed to explore conflicts over the notion of 
the singularity of the Holocaust and the totalitarian paradigm as they take place on and across 
the national, European regional and international levels involving multiple actors and 
networks. 
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International and supranational organizations have in any case contributed significantly since 
2000 to transforming the Holocaust into a symbol of extreme violence and atrocities against 
human beings. This transformation may well raise wider analytical and normative issues, 
however. Does the adaption of the Holocaust as a moral lesson from the past help preserve or 
erase the historical event from memory by dislocating it from time and space? Taking the 
Holocaust as a global symbol of the importance of human rights may foster its remembrance, 
and that of victims. At the same time, it could entail the danger of suppressing or forgetting 
the unique pattern of a specific historical event that affected millions of individual human 
beings. 
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